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1. INTRODUCTION 
The purpose of this document is to report on progress made in recent months and to set out 
the ongoing and future work of the Commission services in relation to preparation for and 
management of serious cross-border health threats in the European Union.  
The Pandemic H1N1 in 2009 was a reminder of the potential of pandemic influenza to cause 
widespread illness, death and societal disruption. Although it was less severe than expected, 
the evaluations carried out by the Commission, emphasized the need to reinforce cooperation 
between Member States within the EU in the management of the response to a pandemic1. 
Based on these findings the Commission services are committed to addressing the lessons 
learnt and to improve preparedness and response throughout the European Union in particular 
by: 
• analysing and proposing mechanisms on joint procurement of vaccines and 
antiviral medication and  
• updating the guidance on influenza pandemic preparedness and response 
planning2. 
The area of communicable diseases such as pandemic influenza is, however, not the only field 
where Europe needs to improve preparedness and response. Reinforcing the collaboration at 
EU level is also required on other serious cross-border health threats whatever the origin of 
the threat.3 
As announced in the 2011 work programme4 the Commission services therefore consider 
starting a revision of the legislation on Communicable diseases and prepare an initiative on 
prevention and control of other serious cross border threats to health. 
This staff working paper is structured along these three elements which are also addressed in 
the Council conclusions of 13 September 2010 on "Lessons learned from the A/H1N1 
pandemic – Health Security in the European Union"5. 
                                                 
1 Member States and /or third countries confronted with an emergency that overwhelms their national 
response capability can, at any time, activate the Community Mechanism for Civil Protection (Council 
Decision 2007/779 EC, Euratom establishing a Community Civil Protection Mechanism; http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:32007D0779(01):EN:NOT) to pool immediate 
civil protection and medical assistance that could be available in other Member States in order to 
support their response strategies. The Commission also adopted a communication 'Towards a stronger 
European disaster response: the role of civil protection and humanitarian assistance'. It includes the 
development of scenarios for the main disaster and the mapping of response capacities, and voluntary 
pools of assets (COM 2010/600 final of 26/10/2010: http://ec.europa.eu/commission_2010-
2014/georgieva/files/themes/european_disaster_response_capacity/final%20text%20EN.pdf). 
2 Communication from the Commission on pandemic influenza preparedness and response planning in 
the European Community of 28 November 2005 
3 For instance, the EU CBRN Action Plan, adopted in 2009, addresses threats which may derive from the 
misuse of chemical, biological and radiological–nuclear material. 
4 COM (2010) 623 Final of 27.10.2010. 
5 Council of the European Union, Document 12665/10 
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All three elements are interlinked and are part of a reinforced EU approach to such health-
related threats, based on the assessment of the H1N1 pandemic, drawing on the experience 
with the existing Communicable diseases legislation and the work of the Health Security 
Committee.  
They are based on the EU mandate to act in monitoring, early warning and combating serious 
cross-border threats to health as enshrined in Article 168 of the Treaty on the Functioning of 
the European Union.  
A. JOINT PROCUREMENT OF VACCINES AND ANTIVIRAL MEDICATION 
The 'Assessment Report on EU-wide Pandemic Vaccine Strategies'6 and the conclusions of 
the Belgian Presidency 'Conference on lessons learnt from the A(H1N1) pandemic' identified 
that the individual procurement of pandemic influenza vaccines and antivirals by Member 
States during the influenza H1N1 pandemic had weaknesses in terms of equitable access and 
purchasing power to obtain favourable contractual conditions on price, liability, 
confidentiality, flexibility to adjust the quantities ordered to actual needs, etc. Therefore, the 
September 2010 Council conclusions invited the Commission to develop a mechanism for 
joint procurement of vaccines and antiviral medication which allows Member States, on a 
voluntary basis, common acquisition of these products or common approaches to contract 
negotiations with the industry. Discussions in the Health Security Committee on options for 
possible joint procurement procedures are on-going. 
Objectives  
The main objectives of the action are to:  
• help participating Member States improve their purchasing power and have 
equitable access to vaccines and antivirals.  
• strengthen solidarity between Member States. 
Joint procurement between Member States is not a new concept: public authorities have been 
pooling purchasing since years in sectors such as defence and transport. Any (joint) 
procurement process should start with a thorough analysis of the needs (what needs to be 
procured, the quantity, technical specifications, delivery, flexibility) which will determine 
appropriate procurement procedure(s). The resulting arrangements for future contract(s) need 
to be settled in advance among the participating contracting authorities in a joint procurement 
agreement. 
Pandemic influenza vaccines and/or antivirals can be procured by a joint call for tender for 
either a public supply contract or a (multiple) framework contract.  
In public supply contracts, all contractual terms need to be specified upfront, which makes 
this option more suitable for e.g. building a stockpile of antivirals. In contrast, framework 
contracts merely set out the general terms and the detailed elements of the service (timing, 
place of delivery, volume per specific requirement…) are defined at a later stage in specific 
contracts.  
                                                 
6 http://ec.europa.eu/health/communicable_diseases/docs/assessment_vaccine_en.pdf 
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Therefore, (multiple) framework contracts are more suitable for e.g. advance procurement of 
pandemic influenza vaccines. Flexibility for specific requirements of participating contracting 
authorities is possible in both contract types by splitting the contract in lots. The Commission 
services intend to examine the possibility for the Commission to participate in any joint 
procurement.  
Individual procurement does not make use of the above-mentioned potential to improve 
purchasing power. This was identified as unsatisfactory by a number of Member States during 
the various discussions on the lessons that could be learned from the management of the 
influenza H1N1 (2009) pandemic. 
The reluctance of vaccine suppliers of bearing full product liability was a major issue for the 
Member States during the recent pandemic. This is an issue which Member States have 
indicated should be negotiated as part of a joint procurement exercise, taking account of the 
fact that in previous national procurement contracts, clauses limiting manufacturers' liability 
may have contributed to reduce citizens trust in vaccine safety. 
Next steps 
Joint procurement has the potential to improve national purchasing power and contribute to 
solidarity between participating contracting authorities. It is however a challenging 
endeavours, as it requires substantial preparatory work and commitment. The more Member 
States that participate in the joint procurement exercise, the more impact the exercise will 
have, both in terms of value added in stronger purchasing power, and in ensuring a wide 
coverage of the participating countries' target groups.  
Work is ongoing in the Health Security Committee on the development of the technical 
modalities of a possible mechanism for joint procurement. 
B. EU PANDEMIC INFLUENZA PREPAREDNESS PLANNING AND RESPONSE  
The Council has invited the Commission on a number of occasions to update the 2005 EU 
guidance on pandemic preparedness and response planning. The European Parliament has 
also called upon the Commission to take a leading role in the co-ordination of all activities 
with regard to pandemic preparedness planning. 
This call is driven by two objectives: the need to reflect the knowledge and experience gained 
from the 2009 pandemic H1N1; and the need for the whole society to be prepared for a 
pandemic in particular by improving business continuity planning in sectors other than health. 
The update of the 2005 EU level pandemic preparedness planning is also required as a means 
to feed into the ongoing work in the World Health Organization on the review of the 
International Health Regulations. It is expected that such a review at the international level 
will be finalized in the course of 2011. In addition, it should be noted that preparedness for 
health threats also benefits from improved pandemic preparedness planning. 
Objectives  
The main objectives of the review are to help Member States:  
• improve resilience of the health sector and strengthen preparedness and response 
across Europe; 
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• strengthen preparedness and response in other sectors of society and economy and 
increase interoperability between sectors to be better able to service the health 
sector; 
• increase co-operation and communication between all stakeholders including key 
international stakeholders. 
The review will thus focus on strengthening continued and resilient functioning in the health 
sector. Proposed actions would cover critical sectors on which the continued and robust 
functioning of the health sector depends in the event of a pandemic and vice versa. Critical 
sectors could be those identified in the WHO document on Whole-of–Society Pandemic 
Readiness7 and could include civil protection authorities. These actions would help Member 
States strengthen the functioning of these sectors, to improve business continuity plans and to 
develop common models to assess and predict the impact of pandemic. 
Next steps 
The Commission services are considering the ways to assist Member States in the process of 
revising national pandemic preparedness plans and improving the state of preparedness and 
response planning. The following main issues would be covered:  
• Member States' regular revision of their national pandemic preparedness plans;  
• strengthening of the cooperation of public health authorities with health 
professionals; 
• development of pandemic severity indicators; 
• development and/or update of Business Continuity Plans in the health sector and 
other relevant/related sectors at EU level;  
• encouragement of solidarity among key players at EU and international level in 
areas such as health service provision, sharing of expertise, experience and 
resources such as medical countermeasures, and further exploiting the possibilities 
of the Common Emergency Communication and Information System developed 
within the framework of the Council Decision 2007/779 EC. 
C HEALTH SECURITY INITIATIVE -2011 
As mentioned in the 2011 Commission work programme, a proposal for the revision of the 
Decision on communicable diseases and an initiative on prevention and control of serious 
cross border health threats at EU level will be considered. 
Objectives  
The main objectives of the initiative would be:  
                                                 
7 WHO guidelines for pandemic preparedness and response in the non-health sectors (Geneva, May 
2009); http://www.un-
pic.org/web/documents/english/WHO%20WOS%20Pandemic%20Readiness%202009-05-05.pdf 
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(1) Reinforcing the collaboration at EU level on serious cross-border health threats (i.e. 
whatever the origin of the threat) taking account of existing structures and mechanisms 
at EU level, which implies: 
• Ensuring coherent risk assessment and risk management for fast evolving threats 
at EU level by putting in place, where necessary, additional structures and 
coordination mechanisms; 
• Identifying and covering the gaps in "monitoring, early warning of and combating 
of serious cross-border threats" from the public health perspective; 
• Strengthening coordination on International Health Regulations implementation, 
public health emergencies of international concern and capacity building at EU 
level. 
(2) Revising the communicable diseases legislation (Decision n°2119/98/EC of the 
European Parliament and the Council8 and its implementing Decisions): 
• This review would take account of changes in the field of epidemiological 
surveillance since the adoption of this legislation, notably the creation of the 
European centre for Disease Prevention and Control (ECDC). It also corresponds 
to the need for simplification and consolidation of this legislation after more than 
a decade. 
• Exploring the possibility of a long-term solution for the Health Security 
Committee. This Committee of representatives of Member States Health 
Ministries has proved to be a valuable instrument for coordination of national 
policies in particular during the H1N1 pandemic. In the framework of the 
abovementioned initiative, the Commission services will consider and examine 
the possibility to put the Health Security Committee on a sounder legal footing, 
taking account of the legal basis available in that purpose in the Treaties, as well 
as of the missions and powers that could be assigned to the Committee within the 
limits of such legal basis. 
                                                 
8 Decision No 2119/98/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 September 1998 setting 
up a network for the epidemiological surveillance and control of communicable diseases in the 
Community 
